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In many countries, charitable contributions benefit from a favorable tax treatment that may take the form of a deduction from taxable income or of a tax credit.
Recently, these tax incentives have been further promoted by the governments of several European countries, as a way to increase private funding for fields like edu cation, research and culture. Assessing the efficiency of these tax treatments is there fore of critical interest for public policy. Compared to charitable giving in the United States, the level of private gifts in France has thus far been relatively low; expressed as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), charitable contributions reported in tax files in France in 2001 were less than one-tenth of those reported by US tax payers.1 The weakness of private charitable contributions in France has served as an impetus for several reforms over the last 15 years that aimed to increase tax incen tives for giving to charities. The French system, which consists of a nonrefundable MAY 2010 tax credit equal to 66 percent of the gift, stands out as a very generous scheme. The French tax credit rate is currently the highest rate among countries with tax credits for charitable giving,2 but it is also higher than the top marginal tax rate in most countries. This implies that French subsidies for charitable giving are much more generous than, for instance, the US incentive system, which works as a deduction from taxable income. Variations in the French tax credit rate due to tax reforms can be exploited as natural experiments in order to estimate the efficiency of tax incen tives toward charitable contributions.
Several empirical papers have used US data to study the effect of tax incentives for charitable giving, focusing on the estimation of the price elasticity of charitable contributions. Early studies (such as Martin S. Feldstein and Amy Taylor 1976) use cross-sectional data to estimate both price and income elasticities of charitable giv ing. They find that the elasticity of giving with respect to the tax-defined price was greater than one in absolute value, suggesting a high responsiveness to tax incen tives. However, these early studies were plagued by identification problems caused by the simultaneous variations of income and price of giving. Since the deduction rate is equal to the marginal tax rate in the United States, and is therefore a function of income, it is difficult to disentangle the effect of a change in income from the effect of a change in price. Studies on panel data (including William C. Randolph 1995; Kevin Stanton Barrett, Anya M. McGuirk, and Richard Steinberg 1997; and Jon Bakija 2000) have tried several methods to separately estimate the transitory changes in prices caused by fluctuations in income and the permanent changes in prices (for a review of studies that use US data, see Bakija and Bradley Heim 2008) . When decomposing income and prices in transitory and permanent components, Randolph (1995) finds estimates of the elasticity of giving with respect to the per manent price of giving ranging from ?0.3 to ?0.5, which is much lower than earlier findings. However, Gerald E. Auten, Holger Sieg, and Charles T. Clotfelter (2002) , relying on a different method to identify transitory and permanent income shocks,3 find higher permanent price elasticities ranging from ?0.79 to ?1.26, and lower transitory elasticities than other studies. Overall, the empirical estimations of the elasticity of charitable giving have, so far, produced mixed results. Moreover, the debate regarding the estimation of the effect of incentives toward charitable giving has generally focused on the way to disentangle transitory and permanent changes in price and income, while other issues have largely been neglected in such investiga tions. Recent papers have pointed out two additional concerns regarding the previ ous estimations. First, Ralph Bradley, Steven Holden, and Robert McClelland (2005) show that censoring may severely affect the estimation of the elasticity of chari table giving in samples where a significant portion of households do not contribute. They estimate the elasticity of charitable giving on a cross-section of US taxpayers, both with the parametric methods classically used to deal with censoring (such as Tobit or Heckman) and with semi-parametric methods. Their results suggest that the parametric assumptions on which the classical methods rely do not hold, and they find much lower estimates with semi-parametric methods than with a Tobit model. Second, Bakija and Heim (2008) show evidence of heterogeneity in the response to tax incentives. Using a long panel of US taxpayers with disproportionately high income, they estimate the elasticity of charitable giving to persistent price separately for different income groups and find that the response tends to be larger for wealthy households than for less wealthy households. Income is one of many possible sources of heterogeneity in households' response to the price of giving. Charitable giving may indeed be motivated by different motives, and the other sources of heterogene ity have been studied very little. In particular, empirical studies generally focus on the estimation of mean effects, but very generous donors' response to tax incentives might be very different from that of smaller donors.
Laboratory and in-the-field experiments have also been conducted to study the behavioral response of individuals to either monetary or nonmonetary incentives.4 Karlan and List (2007) estimate a price elasticity of giving from a field experiment where different rates of matching subsidies were offered to random samples of indi viduals that had previously contributed to a nonprofit organization. They find that although matching subsidies have a significant effect on donations, large matching subsidies do not have a larger impact than smaller matches (which offer to match each dollar given with one additional dollar). The implied elasticity over the sample is ?0.3, but this estimate cannot be compared directly to nonexperimental studies since it focuses on a one-time subsidy to one specific organization, and does not measure longer term effects on the individuals' charitable behavior.
In this paper, we rely on a natural experiment framework to identify the effect of exogenous variations in the price of giving. We use a quantile regression estima tor to deal with censoring and investigate the heterogeneity of responses among households. More precisely, we study the response of French households to two tax reforms that took place in 2003 and 2005 and increased the tax credit rate for chari table contributions in France from 50 percent to 66 percent. These reforms create a pseudo-natural experiment framework, since taxable households experienced a 32 percent decrease in their price of giving during the period, whereas the incentives to give were not modified for nontaxable households, which did not benefit from any price reduction. We take advantage of the fact that the taxable status of households in France is determined not only by income, but also by the size of the family, and select treatment and control groups of taxable and nontaxable households with simi lar income from a large pseudo-panel of households. This strategy allows us to esti mate the effect of tax incentives on charitable giving, while controlling for income effects and for unobserved shocks that could affect the income groups during the period. We use the three-step censored quantile regression estimator proposed by Victor Chernozhukov and Han Hong (2002) to address the problem of censoring in an easily computable way. The quantile regression estimator also allows us to inves tigate the heterogeneity of responses among the distribution of gifts.
4 Analyses of monetary incentives, such as price subsidy or matching, include Dean Karlan and John A. List (2007) , Catherine C Eckel and Philip J. Grossman (2003) , Stephan Meier (2007) , and Steffen Huck and Imran Rasul (2007) Our results show that the overall effect of the reforms is small. The estimated price elasticity of gifts is around -0.2 to -0.6 across quantiles, and below the level that would make the actual French tax credit rate optimal, unless there is significant crowding out between private and public funds. From a public policy perspective, the increase in charitable giving caused by the increase in tax incentives was actu ally smaller than the foregone revenue for the government. We also find evidence that the elasticity of gifts to the tax credit rate is heterogenous among taxpayers, sug gesting that more generous donors react more to tax incentives than smaller donors.
The heterogenous responses show that quantile regressions seem to be a more appro priate tool for studying charitable giving behavior than traditional models (such as Tobit), which rely heavily on the assumption that errors are homoscedastic.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the theoretical framework for analyzing the efficiency of tax incentives toward charitable contribu tions. Section II describes the French tax treatment of charitable contributions and presents the data. The estimation strategy is explained in Section III. Results and sensitivity analysis are presented in Section IV.
I. Evaluating Tax Incentives
The theoretical justifications and the optimal design of subsidies to charitable contributions vary with the modeling of philanthropy. Models of charitable giving usually assume that individuals are not purely altruistic, but that they also enjoy a certain "warm glow" of giving. In other words, a person benefits not only from the total amount of public goods, but also from satisfaction obtained through her own contribution. If individuals were purely altruistic, there would be perfect crowd ing out between charitable contributions and government spending. However, with the warm-glow motive, the crowding out is not perfect and tax incentives might be justified.5 Emmanuel Saez (2004) and Peter Diamond (2006) have investigated the optimal tax treatment of charitable contributions with warm glow of giving motives.
Here we adopt the theoretical framework developed by Saez (2004) to evaluate the efficiency of tax incentives, which expresses the optimal tax subsidies in terms of empirically estimable parameters. Saez considers a model where an individual's utility is a function of private consumption c, earnings z (which enter negatively in the utility to reflect the fact that labor supply is costly), their own charitable contribu tions g (the warm-glow motive), and the aggregate level of charitable contributions G. Individuals therefore maximize max C/(c,g,z, G) s.t. c + g(l -t) < z{l -r) + R, where t is the subsidy rate and r is the tax rate on earnings that is used to finance a lump-sum transfer R to all individuals and the subsidy on g. The number of individu als is large enough so that individuals view G as fixed when maximizing their utility.
Crowding-out effects are introduced into the model by allowing the government to directly contribute to the same public good by an amount GQ. The total amount of public goods becomes G ? Gp + G0, and Gp (the total of private contributions) is therefore directly affected by G0, since G is a component of the Marshallian demand function of every individual gl(l -r, 1 -t, R, G). The crowding-out effect can be expressed as a function of the average private contribution for the given tax param eters and a given G0, denoted G = G (1 ? r, 1 -t, R, G0). The crowding-out effect of increasing G0 is dG/dG0, which we denote GG , and is usually assumed to be between ? 1 (complete crowding out) and 0. 0
In order to derive quantitative tax policy recommendations, Saez (2004) shows that in this set-up, it is useful to make three important assumptions:
(i) that there are no income effects on earnings at the individual level; (ii) that the level of the contributions and the subsidy rate on charitable contribu tions do not affect earnings; and (iii) that the compensated supply of contributions does not depend on the tax rate on earnings (in other words, that contributions are affected by a change in the tax rate on earnings only to the extent that it affects disposable earnings).
The latter two assumptions are implicitly made in the empirical literature on charitable contributions and Saez's (2004) model can be used to relate the findings of the empirical literature to a more general theoretical framework. Under these assumptions, the rule for assessing the optimality of the optimal subsidy rate t can be expressed as a function of ex_n the elasticity of charitable contribution to its price (1 -t):6
In the preceding equation, it appears that in the absence of crowding out between charitable contributions and government spending (GG = 0), subsidies to chari table contributions should be increased when the elasticity is above one in absolute value and decreased when the elasticity is below one in absolute value. Saez (2004) notes that if the elasticity is treated as a constant parameter, as is typical in empirical studies, the formula does not provide an explicit expression for the optimal subsidy.7 The formula nevertheless offers a simple rule for assessing whether the level of the subsidy is too high or too low given the estimated elasticity.
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It is also clear from this framework that the "golden rule" of an elasticity greater than 1 (in absolute value) to assess the efficiency of a subsidy toward charitable giv ing only applies under specific assumptions. If there is some crowding out (GG < 0), a subsidy might be efficient even if the elasticity of charitable giving is lower than one in absolute value. The intuition for this is that if there are some important crowd ing out effects, it is better to rely more on private contributions so that the subsidy rate must be increased to higher levels, even if private contributions respond a little less to these higher subsidies. Moreover, this rule assumes that the government is not constrained in its level of contributions to the public good and can adjust it in response to changes in the level of private contributions, but this might not always be the case (for example, poor relief expenditures might be limited by political econ omy considerations). Furthermore, subsidies toward charitable giving might also be justified at lower elasticity levels if private funds are used much more efficiently than public funds.
This optimality condition can be reconciled with a simple public finance objec tive if we assume that financing the subsidy by the tax rate r has only second-order effects on charitable behaviors and earnings (that is, we neglect all income effects of the tax credit rate t). In this partial equilibrium framework, where the govern ment only wants to promote charitable contributions, increasing the subsidy rate will be efficient from a public finance point of view if the total increase in charitable contributions is greater than the loss in tax revenues, or in other words, if it yields a positive increase in money actually given by taxpayers, net of the subsidy. At the optimum, this condition can be summarized as A [(1 ? t*)G] = 0. Assuming that there is no crowding out and that changes in the subsidy rate do not affect earnings, for small changes of t, the public finance objective leads to the same efficiency rule (1) as in Saez's (2004) framework (if crowding out is excluded). Hence, if we want to assess the efficiency of the reform not according to a first-best criterion, but according to a simple public finance objective, excluding crowding-out effects, specific redistributive tastes of the government, and distortionary costs to collect taxes, we are led to the same simple rule for policy recommendations, that subsidy should be increased if the elasticity is greater than one (in absolute value) and should be decreased if it is less than one (in absolute value).
II. The French Tax System and Charitable Contributions

A. French Tax Incentives Toward Philanthropy
The French System.?A tax incentive toward charitable giving has existed in France since 1954, but has been significantly modified over time. The initial deduc tion mechanism, which worked as a deduction from taxable income, was replaced in 1989 by a nonrefundable tax credit of 40 percent. With a nonrefundable tax credit, all taxpayers benefit from the same tax credit rate equal to t percent of the gift,8 regardless of income level. This differs from the US and UK systems of deduction from taxable income, where the deduction rate is equal to the marginal tax rate faced by the individual, and therefore increases with income. The additional feature of the French system is that the tax credit is nonrefundable, implying that the deduction cannot exceed the income tax that is due for taxable households. Nontaxable house holds do not benefit from the tax incentive either.
Since the late 1980s, the French government has used various strategies in an attempt to boost private philanthropy. After simplifying the law applicable to private foundations of public interest, they turned to tax incentives, implementing three main reforms that exogenously changed incentives toward charitable contributions. The tax credit rate was raised three times:9 from 40 to 50 percent in 1996,10 from 50 
B. Data
Our data come from a unique sample of the French Direction Generat Impots, and include more than 500,000 taxpayers every year. This sample files is called "Echantillon lourd" and is made up of repeated cross-sections of payers drawn every year by the tax administration in order to forecast the evo of tax revenues. The variables available in the dataset correspond to the inform contained in income tax forms: detailed income level and composition, family age, matrimonial status, and expenses eligible for deductions or tax credits.
The main interest of this dataset lies in the fact that, because filing a tax is compulsory in France, we have data for both taxable and nontaxable taxpay Households have incentives to fill out a tax form even if they are not taxable b the taxable income calculated by the tax administration on the basis of the tax d tion is used as a reference to determine eligibility for several means-tested benefits can therefore build up a large sample of roughly 50,000 households close to the tion threshold for each year of our analysis. Table 1 presents the descriptive sta of the households selected in our sample. Overall, only 12-13 percent of house report a gift, so the mean level of gifts in the sample is low. The mean level of among donors is 125 euros for 1998. Additional data in the Appendix includes tics at a more detailed level, and show that some groups of families with childre a much higher income than the sample mean and are still nontaxable.
Another advantage of using tax declarations is that reported gifts are likely to accu rately reflect actual gifts because households are sent a receipt certified by the charity that they have to join to their tax file, in order to show that the amount declared to the tax authority matches the amount recorded by the charity. This reporting mechanism makes it almost costless for a household to report its contributions and explains why the vast majority of contributions to charities are reported in tax data.
Our estimation strategy relies on a difference-in-difference framework between households with the same taxable income, but with some being taxable and oth ers being nontaxable because of the functioning of the French family-splitting. In our setting, a key assumption is that nontaxable households actually report part of their gifts in their tax declarations even though they do not benefit from the chari table tax credit. In fact, we do not need to assume that these households report all their contributions, but only part of their gifts, and that this fraction is constant over time.17 Two types of evidence help us to assess the validity of this identify ing assumption. First, we had access to an external survey, jointly conducted on a sample of 2,047 individuals in 2007 by the CerPhi and the research laboratory GREGOR of the Institut d'Administration des Entreprises de Paris, which inves tigates the reporting behavior of households. Among households whose monthly income is between 1,000 and 4,000 euros, and who declare that they give to char ity, 81 percent of taxable households report their gifts (all the time or some of the time), compared with 46 percent of nontaxable households.18 These raw figures are unadjusted for potential income effects and cannot be directly compared with tax data, as the information is self-reported by individuals and the sample is not a representative sample of the population. But they show that even if nontaxable households do not report their gifts as often as taxable households, a significant proportion still does so. This behavior may be explained by taxpayers' efforts to comply with the tax guidelines, which ask everyone to truthfully report the level of giving in their tax declaration, and because it is not costly to report a gift (since charities send a receipt to all contributors). Second, as we can see in Figure 1 and in Tables Al and A2 in the Appendix, our tax data show that the fraction of house holds reporting gifts among nontaxable groups is substantial, and that the distri bution of donations among nontaxable groups is commensurate to that of taxable groups. This suggests that, for a similar level of income, nontaxable groups do not significantly underreport their gifts compared to taxable groups in our sample. Unfortunately, there is no panel dataset that allows us to check whether the report ing behavior for nontaxable households evolves over time, but there is no reason to expect that it would have changed at the time of the reforms. Notes: DGI, households with taxable income between the thirty-fourth percentile and the eighty-third percentile of the taxable income distribution, and with QF >= 1 and QF <= 5. "Taxable groups" denotes households belonging to groups just above the threshold where the contribution tax credit kicks in, namely people with QF ~ 1 and income between P33 P44, or with QF ? 1.5 and income between P44-P54, or QF = 2 and income between P54 P62, or with QF ? 2.5 and income between P62-P68, or with QF = 3 and income between P68-P76, or with QF = 4 and income between P76-P83. Conversely, "Nontaxable groups" denotes households belonging to groups just below the threshold. 
III. Estimation Strategy
In this section, we describe our estimation strategy, which relies on the exogenous change in tax laws, in a difference-in-difference identification framework, and a three-step quantile regression estimator.
A. Identification: Difference-in-Difference Strategy
The tax credit rate varies over time only for taxable households. To identify the effect of credit rate variations in the presence of unobservable shocks contempo raneous with tax reforms, a proper counterfactual is needed for what would have happened to contributions in the absence of tax reforms. Nontaxable households are good candidates to serve as a control group since their price of giving is one and is not affected by nonrefundable tax credit rate variations. However, we cannot com pare all taxable and nontaxable households because being taxable is largely deter mined by the income level of the household and the support of the covariates of our model varies substantially with income level. In order to design credible treatment and control groups, it is necessary to find variations in tax status that are orthogonal to income, stable over time, and unaffected by variations in the tax credit rate. Our strategy takes advantage of the existence of the mechanism of family tax-splitting in the French tax system, which creates discontinuities in the taxable status according to the number of persons in the household. We can therefore identify the effect of tax incentives toward charitable giving by comparing the evolution of gifts over time for households that have similar income, but are either just above or just below the taxable threshold due to differences in family size.
More specifically, the principle of this tax-splitting mechanism called "Quotient Familiar (thereafter QF) is as follows: each household is granted a QF number n, which increases with the size of the household. A single person is quantified as n = 1, a married couple n = 2, the first two children are equal to 0.5 each, and children beyond the second child are 1. Gross income tax is determined by applying the tax scheme to the ratio Y/n, where Fis taxable income.19 In the following, we say that households are taxable if Yjn is greater than a minimum tax allowance, and nontaxable if Y/n is less than this threshold. For the former, tax credits kick in and actual tax liability is deter mined by further subtracting nonrefundable tax credits (such as credits for charitable giving) and then refundable tax credits from the calculated tax. In order to ensure that the price of charitable giving is not correlated with the level of contributions, we use the taxable status as defined above (without taking into account tax credits) to determine the price of giving faced by each household. In other words, we replace the actual price of gifts by the first-euro price.20 The taxable status is thus solely a function of gross income and family size, and is independent of the level of charitable contributions.
19 Taxable income is gross income minus some deductions.
20 It is a standard procedure in the literature to use the first-dollar price as an instrument for the actual price of gifts (see for example, Bakija and Heim 2008) . In our quantile regression, we directly use the first-euro price in a reduced form framework. We did not want to further complicate the estimation strategy, as the models proposed in the literature to deal with instrumental variables in the censored quantile regression framework are still quite new As a result of the functioning of the QF, some households with the same level of income, but different family sizes, have different incentives. Our methodology is to compare, within stable income groups over time, households that are above the tax allowance threshold and households that are below the threshold due to one (or one-half) additional unit of QF. Households above the threshold experience varia tions in their tax incentives over time, whereas households below the threshold do not experience these variations. Both groups are assumed to be subject to the same unobservable shocks on contributions contemporaneous with tax reforms.
More precisely, our treatment and control groups are defined as follows. We first take households with income ranging between the thirty-third and forty-forth per centiles of the taxable income distribution (P33-P44), and with QF ? 1 or QF ? 1.5. Since the taxable threshold for households with QF ? 1 is stable and roughly equal to the thirty-third percentile of the income distribution over time, and the thresh old for households with QF ? 1.5 is roughly equal to the forty-fourth percentile, households within the P33-P44 income group with QF = 1 are always taxable, whereas households with QF ? 1.5 are not and can be used as a control group. We similarly compare within the P44-P54 income group households with QF ? 1.5 (taxable) versus households with QF = 2 (nontaxable), within the P54-P62 income group households with QF ? 2 taxable) versus households with QF ? 2.5 (non taxable), within the P62-P68 income group households with QF = 2.5 (taxable) versus households with QF ? 3 (nontaxable), within the P68-P76 income group households with QF = 3 (taxable) versus households with QF = 4 (nontaxable) and within the P76-P83 income group households with QF = 4 (taxable) versus households with QF = 5 (nontaxable). We end up with 12 income x QF groups.
Six of these groups contain only taxable households, and 6 contain only nontaxable households. In order to get a larger sample size for inference, we pool together all the groups, under the assumption that the price elasticity is the same across income groups P33-P44, P44-P54, P54-P62, P62-P68, and P68-P76.
The specification is as follows:
(2) hi(g/ft) = E OLj x groups + /?(ln(l -tn) x taxable,) any case, our strategy does not require that nontaxable households report all their gifts, only that the fraction of donations that they report is stable over time.
The second question concerns the stability of the tax status over time. If house holds are highly mobile across groups, moving constantly across the taxable statu threshold, this may affect our estimates in two different ways. On the one hand, t estimated price elasticity of gifts (3 in (2) may mix transitory and permanent pric effects, because households that are taxable, but were not taxable the year before, m optimize the timing of their gifts to take advantage of the tax credit. On the othe hand, the estimated effect of price j3 may underestimate the true elasticity if there is some lack of knowledge about one's ultimate tax status. We pay particular attention to these questions in our robustness checks. Although our data are repeated cross sections, we have information on year n ? 1 taxable income, and we therefore contr for tax status in adjoining years. The fraction of households changing status in our sample is very stable over time and equal to 25 percent. In order to check the sensib ity of our results to the reaction of these households, we add a dummy variable fo those who shifted from a nontaxable group in year n ? 1 to a taxable group in year and another dummy variable for households that shifted from a taxable group in ye n ? 1 to a nontaxable group in year n. We also investigate the effect on our estimat elasticities of removing people changing tax status from the sample.
Finally, taxpayers may anticipate price changes or partly shift donations over time, and our baseline identification strategy may capture these effects in the est mated price elasticity. We also investigate this question in the robustness secti following the methodology of Bakija and Heim (2008) by introducing lagged a future changes in the log price of contributions. 
B. Three-Step Censored Quantile Regression Estimation
Among all taxable French households, the fraction of taxpayers reporting a gift to charities is about 20 percent. In our subsample of taxable and nontaxable house holds, this fraction is about 12 percent as shown in Figure 1 . Dealing properly with the censoring process is therefore of considerable importance for empirical estima tion. Some studies have investigated the question of censoring on US data using tra ditional Tobit models (Randolph 1995) or nonparametric censored regression models (like Bradley, Holden, and McClelland (2005) on cross-sectional data from the US Consumer Expenditure Survey). We use a semi-parametric estimation technique to deal with censoring, relying on a three-step censored quantile regression estimator proposed by Chernozhukov and Hong (2002) . Quantile regressions also enable us to pay attention to the heterogeneity of giving behaviors. In most studies, where the log-log specification is adopted, homogeneity is de facto assumed. However, this assumption might not hold, as some studies have shown that price elasticities and income elasticities could vary with the type of contributors, and be, for example, quite different among rich and poor taxpayers (Bakija and Heim 2008) .
When dealing with censored data, as is the case with contributions left-censored at 0, the OLS estimator is inconsistent. Tobit estimation may solve the censoring problem, but it relies on restrictive distributional assumptions that may prove invalid, particularly if censoring is heavy. Here we implement a censored quantile regression estimation technique that has the advantage of being more flexible than parametric estimation techniques like the Tobit model. This strategy has two main advantages over the Tobit model: it is distribution-free, and allows for heteroscedasticity. The basic intuition is that the conditional quantile of the distribution of gifts is unaffected by the censoring mechanism. This is the reason why we can obtain a consistent estimation without speci fying a complete parametric distribution of the error term, which is impossible when one relies on the conditional mean of the distribution (as is the case in the Tobit model).
To understand the functioning of the three-step censored quantile regression model, it is useful to begin with explaining the standard quantile regression model without censoring. A quantile regression model simply consists of expressing the quantile of the distribution of the dependent variable as a linear function of some covariates X.
Here, our dependent variable is gift G*, and we can express the r-th quantile of the distribution of gifts as Qg*\x(t) = r/?(r). where 0 is the censoring point, and C is an indicator for being cen straightforward estimator of (3 would be to replace the linear for partially linear form:
(6) Min^ ? pT(Gf -max(z;-/3(r), 0)). i=l However, this estimator proposed by James L. Powell (1986) suff low computational efficiency, because linear optimization techniqu with partially linear constraints. The convergence of the Powell es infrequent, especially with large datasets and numerous regressor son why it has not experienced a significant development in the e ture. Many authors have proposed amendments to this original m more practical estimators.24 The three-step version of censored qu models proposed by Chernozhukov and Hong (2002) relies on struct restrictions imposed on the censoring probability to get rid of th constraints in equation (6). These restrictions render this three-step computable, while preserving the main advantages of censored qua namely, the heteroscedasticity and distribution-free character.
The idea of the three-step estimator proposed by Chernozhukov is to construct an iterated algorithm that works in the following wa a subset of observations for which the conditional quantile is in the the distribution. For these observations, a consistent estimator of puted by running a standard quantile regression. The resulting estim to select a more refined subsample of uncensored observations, and the quantile regression. Chernozhukov and Hong (2002) show in Mo lations that the method leads to an efficient estimator after only tw of the quantile regression.
23 When r = 0.5 (median), the program in equation (3) is the minimization of the sum of errors. Overall, quantile regression amounts to minimizing a weighted average of the absolu whereas standard OLS minimize the sum of squared residuals.
24 See for instance Moshe Buchinsky and Jinyong Hahn (1998) among others.
The principle of the three-step censored regression estimator is therefore to begin by selecting a subset of observations for which X'^r) > 0. We select these observa tions by estimating a propensity score of not being censored h(Xi) = P(G* > 01X,), and taking the observations for which h(X) is strictly greater than (1 -r). Intuitively, this ensures that for the selected observations, the fraction of observations with G > 0 is superior to (1 ? r) so that the conditional r-th quantile exists and is above the censoring point. This first step is carried out by estimating a probability model of not censoring:
(7) m = piX'tX) + eh
where r], is the probability that gifts are positive. In our study, we use a simple logit to model the probability of giving, with the set of explanatory variables that are used in the quantile regression. Since our estimation of the true propensity score is possibly misspecified, we do not select all those observations with p(X'i A) > 1 ? r, but we select the observations that have
where c is a trimming constant between 0 and r.25 The next step consists of running a standard quantile regression estimation on the subset J(c) selected in step 1:
The estimate /30(r) of j3(r) is consistent, but not efficient because J(c) is not the largest subset of observations in which h(X^) > 1 ? r. To get the largest subset of observations with X-/3(r) > 0, we use the fact that /30(t) is consistent, and we select all observations that have covariates Xt such that X;/30(r) > 0 26 This step asymp totically selects all the observations with X-/?(r) > 0, which brings efficiency to the third step.
In the third step, we simply run a quantile regression estimation on the obser vations selected during the second step. We then obtain a consistent and efficient estimation /^(t) of (3(t). For each defined conditional quantile, the estimated coef ficient /^(t) represents the marginal effect of a change in the logarithm of the price on the logarithm of the conditional quantile of gift: it can be directly interpreted as a price elasticity. 25 In practice, we choose c so that we can control the size of discarded observations from our subset J(c) = {i:p(X'i\) > 1 -r+ c}. The rule we follow is to select c so that: #J(c)/#J(0) = 90 percent, where 7(0) denotes the subset J, where c ? 0. Chernozhukov and Hong (2002) demonstrate that J does not need to be the largest subset of observations where h(Xi) > 1 ? r.
26 In practice, we select observations such that X; A)(r) > 0 + ?, where f is a small positive number (with -> 0).
We apply this three-step procedure to model (2) presented above. Because th dependent variable is the logarithm of gifts (In (gift)), and since many households d not give to charities, we give every household an extra dollar of gifts so that In (gift is defined for every taxpayer and ranges from 0 to oo. This method is common in previous literature on the subject,27 but given the curvature of the log function, on may be concerned that the elasticity found for very small gifts is affected by thi procedure. We investigate this issue in the robustness check section by setting th censoring point at 10 euros instead of 0.
Computation of standard errors is done via nonparametric bootstrapping. W randomly draw samples of observations from the data, allowing for a very gener form of heteroscedasticity. Still, our computation of standard errors assumes tha error terms are independent over time. As pointed out by Marianne Bertrand, Esthe Duflo, and Sendhil Mullainathan (2004) , the serial correlation of errors within group, over time, may cause a downward bias in the standard errors in difference in-difference estimates. There is, unfortunately, no easy way to solve this proble in our censored quantile regression framework. In particular, there is no guidance on the best way to correct for the group x time serial correlation when the numbe of groups is small, as in our case. Block bootstrapping, which is a way to correct fo serial correlation when the number of groups is large,28 often does not work when the number of groups is small.29 In order to assess the severity of the problem o serial correlation, we run OLS estimations with standard methods of correction o this problem (as described in Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004) and find no loss of significance for the estimated price elasticity in the OLS case.30 Moreover we find very little correlation of residuals over time in the OLS case, suggesting tha serial correlation is not a severe problem in our data.
IV. Results
A. Baseline Estimates
In this section, we present the baseline results and discuss the overall effect of the 2003 and 2005 reforms on charitable giving. Results are displayed in Figure  2 , which graphically represents the quantile coefficient estimates, with the dashed line representing the 95 percent confidence interval calculated from bootstrapped standard errors.31 Note that because of heavy censoring, it is not possible to robustly estimate quantile coefficients below quantile 0.9 for the whole sample.
First, it appears that the overall effect of tax reforms is small. For all defined quantiles, the coefficient estimate ranges from -0.2 to -0.6, which is well below the elasticity that would be required for the credit rate to be optimal without crowding 27 See Andreoni (2006) . Gelbach, and Hilary W. Hoynes (2006 Hoynes ( , 2008 out. The effect of the reforms is also heterogenous as coefficients vary across quan tiles of gifts. The highest quantiles (ninety-fifth and ninety-ninth percentiles) seem to react more to the reforms. If the tax credit variation had led to homogenous behav ioral responses, the whole distribution would have shifted equally, and the coef ficient estimate would be equal across all quantiles. The results can be interpreted as an indication that the reforms led large contributors to contribute more while smaller contributors did not significantly change their habits. It is also interesting to compare our estimate with the OLS and the Tobit estimates, as shown in Table A4 in the Appendix. Because of heavy censoring, the OLS estimate is biased, and leads to a lower estimate of the elasticity than those obtained with quantile regressions. The OLS estimate (?0.161) is comparable to the estimate on the lower quantile, but smaller than the estimates for higher quantiles. The Tobit estimate corresponds to a marginal effect for the conditional mean of the observed gifts of ?0.4, which is closer to the estimates of the higher quantiles. The existence of important distribu tional effects is therefore a drawback for the traditional Tobit estimation in the case of heavy censoring because Tobit estimation extrapolates to the whole distribution the aspect of the distribution on a few uncensored observations. In contrast, quantile regressions do not need to consider the shape of the distribution below the censoring threshold. Our findings regarding the heterogeneity of the effect support our estima tion strategy.
The quantile regression estimates do not provide a simple figure of the mean elas ticity directly comparable with previous estimates. Unfortunately, the calculation of mean effects requires the simulation of a counterfactual conditional distribution of gifts that cannot be done in our setting because we do not know the effect of the tax incentives for the conditional quantiles of gift that are below the censoring point.32 Overall, our estimated elasticities are never inferior to ?0.6 on any con ditional quantile, which means that the mean elasticity cannot be above that level. Therefore, our estimates stand in the lower range of the elasticities found in US data.
Part of the differences between our estimates and the US elasticities may also be due to our focus on households in the middle and upper-middle of the income distribu tion, whereas US studies tend to be done on richer households, which may respond more to tax incentives.
B. Robustness Checks
Time Shifting.?As previously mentioned, people may anticipate price changes, and therefore partly shift contributions over time in order to take advantage of a higher tax credit rate. To make sure that our baseline results are not driven by these time shifting effects, we present results of a specification that introduce lagged and future changes in the log price of contributions.
The specification becomes:
(9) In (gift)/ = E^-x groups + (3x(taxable^ x (ln(l -tn)) j + f32(taxable^ x ( A ln(l -t)) + ^(taxablet) n?l,n x ( A ln(l -f)) + ElnYearni + + e,-, n,n+\ n ? where subscript n stands for year n, tn is the tax credit rate at date n, and A In (1 ? i) n?\,n and A In (1 ? t) stand for the lagged and forward difference in log price of n,n+l contributions.33 f3x identifies the (long-term) elasticity of contributions with respect to price, controlling for optimization behaviors that involve shifting contributions from one year to the other due to anticipated variations in the tax credit rate. If house holds optimize their charitable giving over time, we expect j32 to be negative and /33 to be positive. In case of a reduction in price between year n ? 1 and year n ( A In (1 ? i) < 0), households that re-optimize their approach to giving will n?l,n delay their contributions in year n ? 1 and report them in year n, thus increasing In (gift) in year n, ceteris paribus. Conversely, an anticipated price reduction between year n and year n + 1 will cause people to report lower contributions in year n in order to take advantage of a higher tax credit rate in year n + l.34 MAY 2010 Table 2 Results reported in Table 2 show no evidence that optimizing behavior may occur. The signs of (32 and (33 tend to suggest that households' reactions are delayed, and the effects of the past price variations are not statistically significant. Moreover, introduc ing these controls for lagged and forward variations in price does not significantly affect the value of the (longer-term) elasticity of contributions with respect to price.
Mobility Across Treatment and Control Groups.?Another important assump tion of our identification strategy lies in the stability of control and treatment groups over time. Even though the fraction of households in our sample chang ing status (from taxable to nontaxable or vice versa) is very stable over time, and equal to 25 percent, this may affect our estimates in two opposite ways. On the one hand, the estimated price elasticity of gifts (3 in (2) may mix transitory and permanent price effects because households that are taxable, but were nontaxable the year before, may optimize the timing of their gifts to take advantage of the tax credit. On the other hand, the estimated effect of price f3 may underestimate the true elasticity if there is some lack of knowledge about ultimate tax status. Since we have information on taxable income in year n ? 1, we can control for tax status in adjoining years. We add a dummy for households that shift from a nontaxable group in year n ? 1 to a taxable group in year n, and another dummy variable for households that shift from a taxable group in year n ? 1 to a nontaxable group in year n. Results are reported in Table 2 and show that, contrary to the assumption that people optimize the timing of their gift when moving from one status to the other, people tend to give according to their previous tax status. Nontaxable house holds that were previously taxable tend to give more than nontaxable households, ceteris paribus, and the opposite holds for taxable households that were previously nontaxable. This suggests that some households may lack information about their ultimate tax status and thus their right to claim the charitable tax credit. To inves tigate the magnitude of this potential attenuation bias, we run our baseline specifi cation and remove households that change tax status from the sample. Results are reported in Table 2 and suggest that there is some attenuation bias, mainly affect ing the bottom of the distribution of contributions. The estimated elasticity of contributions is larger for the restricted sample, but mainly on quantile 0.9 to 0.95.
Log-Log Specification.?In the log-log specification adopted here, we follow the standard procedure of rescaling the dependent variable as In (gift + 1) so that the dependent variable is defined for all households and ranges from 0 to oo. Given the curvature of the log function, one may be concerned that the elasticity found for very small gifts is affected by this procedure. To ensure that our results are robust to this procedure, we check that setting the censoring point at 5 or 10 euros instead of 0 did not significantly alter our estimates. We run our three-step censored quantile regression estimator with In (gift) as a dependent variable if gift > 10, and consider the observation to be censored otherwise. The results are reported in Table 2 and confirm that our normalization procedure does not affect the estimated elasticity of the baseline strategy.
V. Conclusion
This paper uses two recent reforms that increased tax deductions for charitable contributions in France to provide new estimations of the effect that these fiscal incentives have on gifts. We show that the increase in fiscal incentives toward chari table giving did not lead to the expected increase in gifts in our sample of house holds. The estimated elasticities, between ?0.2 and ?0.6, are in the lower range of the elasticities found for US data, but are consistent with other results in the lit erature on samples containing middle income rather than high income households.
These estimated elasticities imply that the increase in charitable giving caused by the higher tax credit was smaller than the foregone revenue for the government.
We study the heterogeneity of responses among the distributions of gifts using a three-step censored quantile regression estimator proposed by Chernozhukov and Hong (2002) and find evidence of heterogenous response according to the level of gifts. More generous donors appear to react more to tax incentives than smaller donors, suggesting that tax incentive schemes with higher rates for large gifts might be more efficient than a unique rate. Overall, these results suggest that the actual French credit rate can only be justified if crowding out between private and public contributions is large, or if private funds are much more efficiently used than public funds. 
